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THE THEORETICAL CONSTITUTIONAL SHAPE (AND SHAPING) 
OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 
ROBERT F. BLOMQUIST* 
ABSTRACT 
In order to fathom the theoretical shape of the American national security 
constitutional system, and to appreciate how that system should be shaped in 
the future, it is vital to conceptualize the legal field of American national 
security law as the interaction of four constitutive dimensions.  Initially the 
factual context involves two overarching general concerns: first, the 
maintenance of the Nation’s strategic advantage over challengers, 
competitors, and threats to America’s future; and second, the remarkable 
strategic responsibility of presidents of the United States to deftly shift from 
one serious, potentially catastrophic, crisis to the next.  The second dimension 
is the policy trade-offs of American national security law between calculated 
permutations of liberty, on the one hand, and security, on the other hand.  The 
third dimension of the field entails the threefold characteristics of the values 
and interests of American national security law—preserving the American 
nation and its rule of law, protecting the American people and homeland, and 
defending America’s allies and friends from unauthorized violence and natural 
catastrophes that might destabilize America’s strategic advantage.  The final 
dimension of the field entails the legal doctrine of the primacy of the president 
to fashion national security presiprudence within broad constitutional 
executive powers, subject to reasonably deferential judicial review. 
Form and function in the American national security legal system is best 
understood as flowing from presidential decision and discretion.  Three 
overarching philosophical problems of judicial review of the president’s 
national security decision-making entail the problem of knowledge, the 
problem of conduct, and the problem of governance.  In turn, to flesh out and 
better understand these problems in concrete cases, the Supreme Court must 
be cognizant of the various aesthetics of national security law and the multiple 
 
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law.  University of Pennsylvania (Wharton 
School), 1973; J.D. Cornell University, 1977.  I am grateful for the helpful comments I received 
in response to an earlier version of this Article at the April 2009 Conference, International Law in 
the Domestic Context, held at Valparaiso University.  My thanks go to Pierre Schlag, Robert 
Summers, and Mark Tushnet for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
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potential types of national security arguments.  In resolving problems of 
American national security law, the Court should refrain from citing foreign 
judicial precedent and should rely exclusively on American law and precedent 
for four functional reasons: (1) ethos and American identity, (2) effective 
dispute resolution, (3) meaningful agenda-setting and constitutional dialogue, 
and (4) judicial political legitimacy.  Nevertheless, the Court should be 
cautiously open to non-precedential learning of transnational ideas regarding 
national security issues. 
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I.  PRELIMINARY THEORETICAL CONCERNS 
What is the nature of the American national security constitutional 
system?1  Given the special American constitutional role of the president as 
national security sentinel and the uniquely nationalistic praxis of 
counterterrorism law, what are the key, overarching philosophical problems of 
judicial review of the president’s national security legal work product (what we 
may call national security presiprudence)?2  In approaching the daunting task 
of reviewing American national security law, how should Supreme Court 
Justices and other federal judges envision the shape, or aesthetics, of the field?  
What are the various types of legal arguments that are instrumental in shaping 
American national security law?  What role, if any, should foreign judicial 
precedents play in shaping American national security law? 
This Article addresses these questions, both generally and by specific 
examination of the field of American national security law.3  Angst among 
American jurists and legal commentators about the legitimacy,4 method,5 
 
 1. In general, the field of national security law is only a few decades old.  See NATIONAL 
SECURITY LAW xxxvii (John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., 2d ed. 2005).  A broad 
definition of the field involves “a full synergy of international law, international relations, and 
national law and policy related to the security of the [United States as a nation] and the problem 
of unauthorized violence in the world.”  Id.  The constitutional conundrum of American national 
security law draws its purpose from the famous dictum: “[T]he Constitution, considered only for 
its affirmative grants of power capable of affecting [foreign affairs], is an invitation to struggle 
for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.”  EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: 
OFFICE AND POWERS: 1787–1957, at 171 (4th rev. ed. 1957). 
 2. See infra Part II.A. 
 3. Cf. Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal 
Taxonomy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 229 (2010) (arguing that the “explanatory power” of a legal 
field depends on “the extent to which situations that arise within the field exhibit a recognizable 
pattern”; “the simplicity of the pattern”; “the extent to which the pattern predominates within the 
field”; “the extent to which a single pattern explains the various issues that arise within the field”; 
and, “the scope of situations that arise within the field”). 
 4. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 347–48 (2008).  On one hand, there is a 
category of American judicial citation of foreign court decisions that is “unexceptionable,” and 
legitimate, consisting of persuasive legal arguments about a vexing subject like abortion; use of 
foreign law in a contract that specified that the agreement should be interpreted according to the 
substantive law of another country; reference to international law that is discussed in foreign 
judicial decisions when the U.S. Constitution or a federal statute authorizes a federal court to 
enforce criminal or tort claims based on international law violations; and old English decisions 
used to establish the original meaning of a phrase from the American Constitution.  Cf. id at 348.  
On the other hand, American judicial citation of a foreign decision “cited for its precedential 
effect” by American judges, “searching for a global consensus on an issue of U.S. constitutional 
law” is problematic.  Concerns of legitimacy in American judges citing foreign judicial decisions 
as precedent include the usurpative imposition of “cosmopolitan values . . . in the name of our 
eighteenth-century Constitution . . . .”, and the “undemocratic” extraction of foreign precedent 
and its injection into the American constitutional system.  Id. at 352, 353.  See also Cheryl 
Saunders, Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Is There a Problem?, 59 CURRENT 
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transparency,6 and context of citation of foreign case law7 in American 
constitutional adjudication provides a useful foil8 for describing the shape of 
 
LEGAL PROBS. 2006 91, 108, 126 (2007) (pointing out that while citation to foreign law in 
constitutional adjudication of countries such as Australia, Canada, Israel, South Africa, and the 
United Kingdom raise no legitimacy concerns because of these nations’ constitutional systems 
and national self-conceptions, legitimacy is an issue when American judges cite foreign law by 
virtue of the logic of the American judicial appointment process, which draws its force from the 
democratic legitimacy of the elected president and Senate). 
 5. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 349–52.  Methodological objections of American judicial 
citation of foreign judicial precedent include “the promiscuous opportunities that such a practice . 
. . opens up”; the “wasteful ‘arms race’ character” of the practice where, “[i]f one [American] 
judge starts citing such [foreign] sources, opposing judges are placed under pressure to go 
digging in the same sources for offsetting citations”; the illusion that “the world’s judges 
constitute a single community of wisdom and conscience”; and the arrogance and usurpation by 
“sophisticated cosmopolitans” wearing judicial robes, who misguidingly try to “impose their 
cosmopolitan values on Americans in the name of our eighteenth-century Constitution.”  Id.; see 
also Saunders, supra note 4, at 99–100 (analyzing the sophisticated methodological issues in 
citation to foreign sources of law that are underappreciated or under-theorized including whether 
the foreign legal citation involves a “conclusion of law, a constitutional or legal norm” or “an 
argument, a value, a perception, an interpretative approach, or merely a happy turn of phrase”; the 
various potential stages in a court’s reasoning process when citation to “foreign experience” takes 
place, for example, “to frame the question,” or “to identify options or more generally to survey 
the field,” or “to test a hypothesis,” or, “to confirm a conclusion,” or “to explore the 
consequences of a particular result”). 
 6. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 350.  Citation of foreign judicial decisions by American 
judges is really just “one more form of judicial fig-leafing” whereby judges—”timid about 
speaking in their own voices lest they make legal justice seem too personal”—seek to “further 
mystify the adjudicative process” and to obscure the real bases for politically-charged 
constitutional cases that derive from “their personal experiences, values, intuitions, temperament, 
reading of public opinion, and ideology.”  Id. 
 7. See id. at 351–53, 366 (arguing that “foreign [judicial] decisions emerge from a complex 
social, political, historical, and institutional background of which most [American] judges and 
[j]ustices are ignorant”; foreign constitutional courts often have incentives to issue “audaciously 
progressive opinions” because the foreign judges know their constitutional rulings can be 
nullified by a legislative supermajority vote, while overruling a constitutional ruling by the 
Supreme Court of the United States requires the arduous amendment process of ratification by 
three-fourths of the states and two-thirds vote in both houses of Congress; and foreign judicial 
decisions are often aggressively interventionist policy determinations based on foreign legal 
systems “alien to our own system” and antithetical to the American historical experience); see 
also Saunders, supra note 4, at 126 (pointing out a “range” of contextual “reasons why references 
to foreign law in constitutional cases might begin to attract closer, and not necessarily friendly, 
scrutiny” including “the impact of the new emphasis on differences in comparative private law; 
the growing nationalism that is a sign of the times, whether as a reaction against increasingly 
heterogeneous communities, threats of terrorism or globalization; and the mounting hostility to 
judicial activism”). 
 8. Indeed, much has been written in recent years about the appropriateness, circumstances 
and methodology of American courts (particularly the Supreme Court of the United States) citing 
foreign law or international law in the course of constitutional and other types of adjudication.  
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American national security law and the forces that should and should not shape 
this field of law in the future.  American national security law is saturated by 
diverse and profound questions of constitutional interpretation.  Since 
September 11th and the commencement of the American wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan a few years ago, there has been a “frenetic pace of developments” 
in American national security law that is likely to continue into the foreseeable 
future.9  The flavor of this torrent trend in the field of national security law is 
captured by the preface of a recent combined supplement to two law books that 
highlights the following novel developments: 
[N]ew information about the rationale for the war in Iraq, a second decision 
from the FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act] Court of Review . . . , 
and the latest in a remarkable series of rulings on national security letters . . . .  
Also included . . . [is] a new Second Circuit decision on the extra-territorial 
application of the [Fourth] Amendment . . . , the Supreme Court’s decision in a 
suit for damages alleging mistreatment of a terrorism suspect in custody . . . 
and a dramatic post-Boumediene decision concerning the reach of the writ of 
habeas corpus to Afghanistan . . . .  The election of a new President has, 
predictably, brought a number of changes as well, and many of those are 
 
See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory of Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. 
REV. 639 (2005); James Allan, Jeremy Waldron and the Philosopher’s Stone, 45 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 133 (2008); James Allan & Grant Huscroft, Constitutional Rights Coming Home to Roost? 
Rights Internationalism in American Courts, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2006); Stephen Breyer & 
Antonin Scalia, A Conversation Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices: The Relevance of Foreign 
Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia 
and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519 (2005); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent 
Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a Comparative Perspective on 
Constitutional Adjudication, 64 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 575 (2005); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional 
Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005); Harold 
Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43 (2004); Ken I. Kersch, 
The New Legal Transnationalism, the Globalized Judiciary, and the Rule of Law, 4 WASH. U. 
GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 345 (2005); David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 
652 (2005); John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 1175 (2007); Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use 
of Foreign Law, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 637 (2007); Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political 
Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, (2005); Mark C. Rahdert, Comparative Constitutional Advocacy, 
56 AM. U. L. REV. 553 (2007); Mark Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less Better Than Knowing 
More? Unpacking the Controversy Over Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. 
REV. 1275 (2006); Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 129 (2005); Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Demominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 148 (2005). 
 9. See NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (4th ed.) & COUNTERTERRORISM LAW (Stephen Dycus 
et al. eds., Supp. 2009). 
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reflected here in executive orders, speeches, and materials from the Justice 
Department.10 
As an opening theoretical gambit, in expansive and synoptical theoretical 
terms, “[w]e can conceptualize a legal field as the interaction of four 
underlying constitutive dimensions of the field: (1) a factual context that gives 
rise to (2) certain policy trade-offs, which are in turn resolved by (3) the 
application of values and interests to produce (4) legal doctrine.”11  The factual 
context of American national security law problems involves two overarching 
general concerns: first, the maintenance of the Nation’s strategic advantage 
over challengers, competitors, and threats to America’s future;12 and second, 
the remarkable strategic responsibility of presidents of the United States to 
deftly shift from one serious, potentially catastrophic, crisis to the next.13  The 
policy trade-offs of American national security law encompass calculated 
permutations between liberty, on the one hand, and security, on the other hand.  
The values and interests of American national security law are threefold: 
preserving the American nation and its rule of law, protecting the American 
people and homeland, and defending America’s allies and friends from 
unauthorized human violence and natural catastrophes that might destabilize 
America’s global strategic advantage.  Finally, the overarching legal doctrine 
of the field of American national security law is the primacy of the president to  
  
 
 10. Id. at ix.  “We expect the frenetic pace of developments to continue for the foreseeable 
future, with two wars still underway, looming threats in Iran and North Korea, a flood of national 
security-related litigation working its way through the court system, and the articulation of new 
policies by the Obama administration.”  Id. at x. 
 11. Aagaard, supra note 3, at 225. 
 12. See BRUCE BERKOWITZ, STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE:  CHALLENGERS, COMPETITORS AND 
THREATS TO AMERICA’S FUTURE (2008). 
 13. See Robert F. Blomquist, The Jurisprudence of American National Security 
Presiprudence, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 881, 887 & n.34 (2010) [hereinafter Blomquist, 
Jurisprudence]. 
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fashion national security presiprudence within broad constitutional executive 
powers, subject to reasonably deferential judicial review of facts and law.14   
 
 14. Cf. Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361 (2009) 
(arguing that national security fact deference by the judiciary should not entail a “one-size-fits-all 
solution”).  Thus, a nuanced and balanced view of national security fact deference—closely 
intertwined with the precise legal issue involved in a particular case—leads to the following “key 
insights”: 
 Comparative institutional accuracy arguments can favor the executive branch, but judges 
cannot assume that this is so simply because a factual dispute has national security 
connotations. 
 Comparative accuracy can be a function of superior access to information or expertise, 
but in any event deference is not appropriate on this ground absent a showing that the 
decision actually exploited such advantages in a reliable manner. 
 Judges should not be too quick to assume that executive agencies hold an advantage 
over the judiciary with respect to information access; the possibility that information can 
be passed through to the judge, combined with the potential for new information to 
emerge in the adversarial process, render this inquiry unmanageable in many if not most 
instances. 
 Special expertise [of the executive branch] is more likely to matter in the context of 
predictive judgments—which at times shade into opinion or policy judgment—than in 
the context of retrospective factfinding. 
 Cognitive biases are significant concerns for any factfinding process, but it is unclear 
that judges are in a position to detect their presence.  In any event, predicating deference 
on a showing that the executive reliably employed epistemic advantage may guard 
indirectly against such concerns, via the third party accountability effect. 
 Weighted accuracy concerns driven by the magnitude of the litigants’ interests (the 
government’s national security concerns, for example, or a private person’s fundamental 
rights) are likely to be a wash in this setting, in which case it makes more sense to 
prioritize core accuracy and other prudential concerns. 
 Efficiency concerns relating to speed, agenda control, and resource consumption 
ordinarily should have no impact on the fact deference question, however important they 
may be in other contexts. 
 Prudential concerns regarding the collateral consequences of non-deferential review, 
including the risk of disrupting military operations or exposing classified information, 
are legitimate concerns, but they are better addressed through procedural devices such as 
the state secrets privilege. 
 The fact that a national security related claim is justifiable does not mean that 
institutional self-preservation concerns drop out of the picture; fact deference provides a 
tempting—and not very transparent—opportunity for a judge to accommodate such 
prudential concerns. 
 Democratic accountability concerns are weak with respect to retrospective factfinding, 
but they can be strong with respect to predictive judgments—particularly where the 
latter involves elements of opinion or policy judgment. 
 Legitimacy concerns, understood as claims of formal allocation of authority to the 
executive branch, do no independent work in this context; on close inspection legitimacy 
arguments collapse into one another of the functional and prudential concerns described 
above. 
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The relationship among these broad components of the field of American 
national security law can be illustrated by a conceptual diagram:15 
FIGURE 1: 
CONCEPTUAL DIAGRAM OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On a second preliminary theoretical level, we should be cognizant of the 
experimentation and innovation, within the domain of American law, that has 
transpired during the first decade of the twenty-first century by American 
lawyers, executive branch officials, and judges in processing difficult cases 
that have emerged in the field of American national security law—a trend that 
is likely to continue in the future.  As noted by Professors Chesney and 
Goldsmith, by way of an important illustration of American national security 
law experimentation and innovation, the models of criminal justice versus the 
military detention approach for responding to terrorists have been 
converging.16  As they explain: “During [recent] years, the military detention 
system has instituted new rights and procedures designed to prevent erroneous 
detentions, and some [American] courts have urged detention criteria more 
oriented toward individual conduct than was traditionally the case.”17  But 
 
Id. at 1432–33.  But see, RICHARD A. POSNER, COUNTERING TERRORISM: BLURRED FOCUS, 
HALTING STEPS 173 (2007) (“[V]ery few judges other than the handful assigned to the two 
foreign intelligence courts have security clearances, or . . . know anything about national security, 
including the scope and gravity of the terrorist threat and the best methods of combating it.”). 
 15. I am indebted to Todd S. Aagaard for the inspiration of this conceptual diagram which 
he applied to the field of environmental law.  Aagaard, supra note 3, at 279. 
 16. Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and 
Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1080–1081 (2008). 
 17. Id. at 1081. 
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interestingly, “the criminal justice system has diminished some traditional 
procedural safeguards in terrorism trials and has quietly established the 
capacity for convicting terrorists based on criteria that come close to 
associational status.”18  While “neither model as currently configured” presents 
a final answer to “the problem of terrorist detention,”19 the trend of 
convergence “does identify areas of [American] consensus about detention 
criteria and procedural safeguards and highlights the outstanding issues that 
any serious detention reform must face.”20  Given the silence of what particular 
international treaty-based detention criteria apply to non-international armed 
conflicts (NIACs)—the type of conflict epitomized by terrorist attacks on 
Americans in the last decade or so—detention criteria have properly been 
subject to discretionary experimentation and innovation by American legal 
officials.21 
A third preliminary theoretical matter involves the nature and limits of 
“constitutional borrowing”22 of ideas from foreign legal sources in the 
development of the field of American national security law.  “[C]onstitutional 
borrowing is the practice of importing doctrines, rationales, tropes, or other 
legal elements from one area of constitutional law into another for persuasive 
ends.”23  One facet of constitutional borrowing is “cross-border appropriation 
of ideas, and often within a single area of constitutional law.”24  In the field of 
American national security law there exists a vexing question of “fit”25—
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1086–87.  Cf. Michael Chertoff, The Responsibility to Contain: Protecting 
Sovereignty Under International Law, 88 FOREIGN AFF. 130, 130–32 (2009) (arguing against the 
subordination of “established U.S. laws and even U.S. constitutional provisions” to “international 
legal mandates and ‘customary’ international law—in which ‘custom’ is not traditionally 
interpreted, as being on the actual practices of states, but instead is dictated by the policy 
preferences of foreign judges or, worse yet, international scholars and academics”; arguing for the 
eventual creation of a “modern international legal order” entailing “individual states assum[ing] 
reciprocal obligations to contain transnational threats emerging from within their borders so as to 
prevent them from infringing on the peace and safety of fellow states around the world”; but the 
new international legal framework “will be successful only if sovereign consent of individual 
nations,” in international treaties or conventions, “remains the bedrock of international law and 
only if” the trend is resisted by the United States to have “broad and abstract norms through 
undemocratic means” imposed on its development of national security law). 
 22. See Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459 
(2010). 
 23. Id. at 461 (footnote omitted). 
 24. Id. at 467 n.15.  Indeed, while cross-border constitutional borrowing is only one type of 
constitutional borrowing, since “all manner of legal appropriations, both between different legal 
systems and within . . . a single political order” are possible, id. at 467, cross-border constitutional 
borrowing is probably the most controversial to Americans. 
 25. Id. at 495–99. 
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”[h]ow well different bodies of constitutional knowledge fit together”26—
because “the rule of law requires that material taken across boundaries bear a 
defensible relationship to existing cultural practices and political 
commitments.”27  Moreover, there is also a troublesome issue of 
“transparency”28 in cross-border constitutional borrowing in the field of 
American national security law when foreign precedents might be covertly 
cited without “revealing [their] genesis or evolution,”29 without a nuanced 
discussion of their “pedigree,”30 and without a “painstakingly”31 thorough 
discussion of context.32 
The remaining portions of this Article proceed as follows: In Part II, 
attention is first focused on the form and function of the American national 
security system and the systematizing device of American national security 
presiprudence.  Then, I delineate key philosophical problems facing the 
American judiciary in reviewing national security presiprudence (the problem 
of conduct, the problem of knowledge, and the problem of governance).  This 
analysis is followed by a discussion of the four aesthetics of American national 
security law (grid, energy, perspectivist, and disassociative) that are explained 
and elaborated in relation to five types of potential national security legal 
arguments (text, intent, precedent, tradition, and policy).  Part III of the Article 
applies the concepts that are fleshed out in Part II to the specific question of 
whether and how American judges should use foreign judicial precedent in 
reviewing presidential national security law decisions—if you will, a 
dimension of the jurisprudence of American national security presiprudence. 
II.  FORM AND FUNCTION IN THE AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY LEGAL 
SYSTEM 
A. American National Security Presiprudence 
As the early twentieth-century jurisprude, Rudolf von Jhering, once 
remarked: “Form is rooted in the innermost essence of law.”33  Taking 
 
 26. Id. at 495. 
 27. Id. at 497. 
 28. Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 22, at 499. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Cf. Michael Kirby, The Common Law and International Law—A Dynamic 
Contemporary Dialogue, 30 LEGAL STUD. 30 (2010) (discussing the fit and transparency of 
constitutional borrowing in countries like South Africa, India, and Canada, where constitutional 
provisions have stimulated the change, and in commonwealth countries like Australia, where a 
framework or tradition of constitutional borrowing is extant). 
 33. ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND FUNCTION IN A LEGAL SYSTEM: A GENERAL STUDY 3 
(2006) (footnote omitted). 
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inspiration from this abstract observation, Professor Robert S. Summers 
introduced his book-length study of legal form by arguing: 
Many leading scholars and theorists of law in the twentieth century including 
H.L.A. Hart and Hans Kelsen, viewed a legal system as essentially a system of 
rules.  In developed Western societies, however, a legal system is far more 
than this.  It is made up of diverse functional units only one major variety of 
which consists of rules.  These diverse units are, in turn, duly organized in 
complex ways to form a system.  To grasp the nature of a legal system, it is 
first necessary to understand the diverse functional units of the system.  These 
include institutions, such as legislatures and courts [and executives], legal 
precepts such as rules and principles, nonpreceptual species of law such as 
contracts and property interests, interpretive and other legal methodologies, 
sanctions and remedies and more.  A discrete legal unit does not function 
independently.  It must be combined and integrated with other units.34 
Summers goes on to theoretically describe “the overall form of a legal 
system as whole” as “a highly complex purposive systematic arrangement 
designed to govern in accord with law a population typically residing in a 
geographically contiguous area.”35  He asserts the importance of 
“systematizing devices” of a robust legal system that include, among others, 
the following: “the centralization and hierarchical ordering of legislatures, 
courts, administrative bodies and other entities operating within their own 
jurisdictional spheres”;36 “specification of systematic priorital relations as 
between first-level legislative, judicial, administrative and other jurisdictional 
spheres . . . specifying how general types of conflicts between otherwise valid 
rules, between other law, and between officials and their actions are to be 
resolved”;37 “codification, consolidation, or other continuing systematization 
of first-level rules and other law, into one field after another, into coherently 
ordered bodies of law”;38 and “adoption of uniform interpretive . . . and other 
first-level methodologies”39 to create coherence and hierarchically-ordered 
institutional arrangements.40 
Energized by Professor Summers’ overarching systematic legal theory, I 
developed an account of what I call American national security 
presiprudence.41  Presiprudence—the legal work product of the presidents of 
 
 34. Id. at 3–4 (footnotes omitted). 
 35. Id. at 305. 
 36. Id. at 308. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. SUMMERS, supra note 33, at 308. 
 40. Id. at 309. 
 41. Robert F. Blomquist, American National Security Presiprudence, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. 
REV. 439 (2008), reprinted in TOP TEN GLOBAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW ARTICLES 55 (Amos N. 
Guiora ed., 2009) [hereinafter Blomquist, Presiprudence]. 
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the United States—is a concept I formulated based on the Presidential Oath 
Clause in Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution42 that prescribes a unique 
oath to be taken by the presidents-to-be before assuming the executive power 
of the national government and which contemplates a special responsibility of 
American presidents to articulate, safeguard, and watch over the American 
national interest.43  My premise in an earlier article was “that, in the spirit of 
existing scholarly fields of endeavor which attempt to systematize and critique 
the coherence and robustness of the judiciary’s legal work product 
(jurisprudence) and the legislature’s legal work product (legisprudence),” it is 
appropriate to begin to develop related attention to the legal work product of 
the president (presiprudence).44 
American national security presiprudence, therefore, is a type of 
systematizing device, described by Summers’ form and function legal theory,45 
that constitutionally instantiates the president as the American national security 
sentinel based on a broad—but not unlimited—interpretation of presidential 
power. 46  This broad interpretation—giving rise to the logic of the presidential 
American maximum security state, in appropriate circumstances—derives 
from the intellectual roots of the American Presidency (those antecedents in 
political philosophy and legal history, the lessons of ancient history and of 
Colonial and Revolutionary experience) that demonstrate that the Founders 
fashioned that unique institution with the contextual logos that presidents have 
expansive powers to pursue the American national interest.47  Moreover, this 
broad interpretation of presidential national security power flows from the 
preponderance and prestige of strong executive advocates among the Founders 
coupled with the historical precedents of strong and powerful presidential 
 
 42. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 7. 
 43. Robert F. Blomquist, The Presidential Oath, The American National Interest and a Call 
for Presiprudence, 73 UMKC L. REV. 1, 51 (2004), cited in McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of 
Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 886 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Blomquist, Presidential Oath]. 
 44. Blomquist, Presiprudence, supra note 41, at 440; Blomquist, Presidential Oath, supra 
note 43, at 52 (“The Presidential oath is properly understood as the constitutional keystone of the 
American Republic: it commands the President of the United States to preserve, protect and 
defend—as well as articulate, pursue and achieve—the legal embodiment of the American 
national interest.  A new field of inquiry, which I have coined presiprudence, may help scholars 
elaborate theoretical insights on the President’s pursuit of the legal national interest.”).  Cf. 
Richard M. Pious, Inherent War and Executive Powers and Prerogative Politics, 37 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 66, 74 (2007) (“The relationship between the oath of office (requiring 
that the president to execute the office, and preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution, but not 
mentioning execution of the law) and the clause that requires the president to ‘take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed’ leaves open the possibility that a president, in fulfilling his oath, may 
decide that specific laws need not or cannot be executed, especially in emergency situations.”). 
 45. See supra notes 33–40 and accompanying text. 
 46. Blomquist, Presiprudence, supra note 41, at 441. 
 47. Id. at 441–48. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
452 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXX:439 
actions to preserve, protect, and defend the Nation from the time of George 
Washington to modern-era presidents.48  New geopolitical realities during the 
first decade of the Twenty-First Century (the September 11th attacks and 
subsequent terrorist attacks around the globe) add force to the necessity and 
justification of our presidents to engage in careful “articulating, planning, and 
managing an array of law and policy measures to protect the American 
homeland, including surveilling and interdicting those who seek to harm 
American national security, broadly defined.”49 
B. Three Overarching Philosophical Problems of Judicial Review of 
American National Security Presiprudence 
In approaching the question of judicial review of American national 
security law and policymaking by the presidents of the United States (what I 
call American national security presiprudence), the judiciary must resolve 
three overarching philosophical problems.50  First, the problem of knowledge 
(developed within the fields of epistemology and metaphysics) raises issues of 
the judiciary’s access to global intelligence on threats facing the United States; 
the judiciary’s baseline knowledge of past, present, and future security 
concerns; the experience of judges in understanding, imagining, intuiting, and 
reasoning about American national security; and the judiciary’s skill in 
making, assessing, and second-guessing probabilistic evidence and pattern 
recognition dealing with both concrete and abstract national security matters 
such as intelligence functions (collection, analysis and dissemination, covert 
action, counterintelligence and liaison) and homeland security regimes (nuclear 
nonproliferation, maritime security, public health, and other matters). 
 
 48. Id. at 448–57.  This is not to say, however, that presidents have preclusive power to 
wage war in the face of contrary congressional statutes—the so-called “lowest ebb” of the 
president’s authority as Commander in Chief.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).  See David J. Barron & Martin S. Ledermann, The 
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original 
Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 691 (2008); David J. Barron & Martin S. Ledermann, 
The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 
(2008). 
 49. Blomquist, Presiprudence, supra note 41, at 457.  Of course, presidential national 
security actions will be subject to potential checking legislation by Congress.  Id. at 481.  Still, 
the president could “openly declare his constitutional objection to . . . congressional 
micromanaging of national security,” or, in a less confrontational strategy, “work around certain 
congressional restrictions by administrative finesse and creative interpretation” like use of 
“necessary and proper constructions of the legislation, enabling the president and designated 
administrative agencies to fulfill the duties expressly required by the legislation according to the 
norms of administrative efficiency.”  Id. (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 50. I am indebted to Daniel Robinson for suggesting this philosophical framework.  DANIEL 
N. ROBINSON, THE GREAT IDEAS OF PHILOSOPHY 1 (2d ed. 2004). 
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Second, the problem of conduct (the domain of ethics and moral 
philosophy) implicates the need for judges to probe the consequences of their 
review of sensitive national security determinations by the presidents and their 
advisers—consequences to the litigants, consequences to the efficacy and 
efficiency of the national security process of the Nation, consequences to the 
coherence and integrity of the rule of law, and consequences to the foreign 
relations of the United States. 
Finally, the problem of governance (expanded by political theory, political 
science, public policy, and systematic legal analysis) triggers questions of 
conflict—between human and civil rights, government officials, branches of 
government (executive, legislative, and judicial), and competing legal 
principles—and questions of hierarchy among types of government (federal, 
state, local, multi-national, and international). 
C. Potential Aesthetics and Legal Arguments of American National Security 
Law 
In attempting to delve into concrete cases involving American national 
security law, judges can gain clarifying insight in deciding upon their proper 
role by considering four key aesthetics of national security law and five 
potential types of national security legal arguments that lawyers could 
conceivably fashion. 
1. Aesthetics of American National Security Law 
Professor Pierre Schlag offered an incisive comment in his 2002 landmark 
article, The Aesthetics of American Law: “Law is an aesthetic enterprise.  
Before the ethical dreams and political ambitions of law can be articulated, let 
alone realized, the aesthetics of law have already shaped the medium within 
which those projects will have to do their work.”51  Schlag convincingly 
moved beyond what he characterized as “a conventional understanding of 
aesthetics as the province of beauty and fine art” to his articulation of a 
“description of those recurrent forms that shape the creation, apprehension, and 
identity of the law.”52 
While Professor Schlag’s project has a widespread illuminating power to 
clarify many areas of American law,53 his general four-part aesthetic of 
American law is robustly apt for unpacking national security law.  First, there 
is a grid aesthetic: 
 
 51. Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1049 (2002). 
 52. Id. at 1050–51. 
 53. See, e.g., Robert F. Blomquist, Re-Enchanting Torts, 56 S.C. L. REV. 481, 490–505 
(2002) (applying Schlagian aesthetics to American tort law). 
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[The grid is a] two-dimensional area divided into contiguous well-bounded 
legal spaces.  These spaces are divided into doctrines, rules, and the like.  
Those doctrines, rules, and the like, are further divided into elements, and so 
on and so forth.  The subjects, doctrines, elements, and the like are cast as 
“object-forms.”  They exhibit the characteristic features of objects: 
boundedness, fixity, and substantiality.  They have insides and outsides that are 
separated by well-marked boundaries.  The resulting structure—the grid—feels 
solid, sound, determinate.  Law is etched in stone.  The grid aesthetic is the 
aesthetic of bright-line rules, absolutist approaches and categorical 
definitions.54 
Modern American national security law has four key axes: the U.S. 
Constitution, congressional enactments providing a statutory gloss and 
interpretation of the Constitution, presidential decision-making processes that 
invoke national security, and key judicial decisions by the Supreme Court.55  
Interspersed along these four axes are an assortment of specific subjects, 
doctrines, and elements.  Enumerated constitutional powers (and limitations) 
involve: federal governmental powers found in the Preamble,56 congressional 
powers in Article I,57 presidential powers in Article II,58 the federal judiciary’s 
 
 54. Schlag, supra note 51, at 1051. 
 55. Some might argue that a fifth axis of modern American security law is the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945) in particular provisions 
of the U.N. Charter dealing with the Security Council, U.N. Charter arts. 23–32; the provisions 
dealing with the pacific settlement of disputes, id. arts. 33–38; the provisions addressing action 
with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, id. arts. 39–51; 
and the provisions dealing with regional arrangements for maintenance of international peace and 
security, id. arts. 52–54.  See, e.g., MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW: UNDERSTANDING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 147–55 (2005) (asserting the paramount 
importance of the United Nations Security Council).  I contend, however, that the best way to 
conceive of the U.N. Charter and the Security Council is not in terms of the grid aesthetic of 
clear-cut rules and categorical definitions, see supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text, but in 
terms of two other, less fixed and determinate, aesthetics—the perspectivist aesthetic and the 
dissociative aesthetic, see infra notes 93–127 and accompanying text. 
 56. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect 
union, . . . insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense . . . do ordain and 
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”). 
 57. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (uniform naturalization power); id. cl. 10 (power “[t]o define and 
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of 
Nations”); id. cl. 11 (power “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make 
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water”); id. cl. 12 (power “[t]o raise and support 
Armies”); id. cl. 13 (power “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy”); id. cl. 14 (power “[t]o make 
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”); id. cl. 15 (power “[t]o 
provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and 
repel Invasions”); id. cl. 16 (power “[t]o provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the 
Militia . . . and the Authority of training the Militia”); id. cl. 17 (power over the District of 
Columbia and “to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the 
Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, 
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Article III powers over cases or controversies,59 the federal Supremacy Clause 
in Article VI,60 the non-delegated police powers of the States in the Tenth 
Amendment,61 and the individual liberties fleshed out in the Bill of Rights and 
subsequent amendments.62  The axis of congressional enactments that provide 
a statutory gloss and interpretation of the Constitution’s national security 
provisions includes: the War Powers Resolution,63 the National Security Act of 
1947, as amended,64 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
(FISA),65 the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 
 
Arsenals, dock-Yards and other needful Buildings”); id. cl. 18 (power “[t]o make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any Department 
or Officer thereof”). 
 58. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America”); id. cl. 8 (“Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the 
following Oath or Affirmation: ‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the 
Office of the President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect 
and defend the Constitution of the United States’”); id. § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be the 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several 
states . . . .”); id. cl. 2 (“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
to make Treaties . . . .”); id. § 3 (“[He] shall . . . take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, 
and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States”). 
 59. Id. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . . to Controversies to which the 
United States shall be a Party . . . .). 
 60. Id. art. VI, cl. 2 (“The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made . . . under the Authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”). 
 61. Id. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”). 
 62. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and to petition the 
government); id. amend. II (right to bear arms); id. amend. III (no quartering of troops in any 
house with limited exceptions); id. amend. IV (right to be free of unreasonable searches and 
seizures and warrant requirements); id. amend. V (due process required for deprivation of life, 
liberty or property, eminent domain limitations); id. amend. VI (right to speedy and public 
criminal trial, right of confrontation, right of compulsory process, right of assistance of counsel); 
id. amend. VIII (no excessive fines or bail, no cruel or unusual punishment to be inflicted by 
government); id. amend. IX (other rights contemplated). 
 63. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1541–1548). 
 64. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (codified as amended at 
50 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (2006)). 
 65. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2518–2519 and 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811). 
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2001,66 the Military Commissions Act of 2006,67 and other enactments.  The 
axis of presidential decision-making processes that invoke national security 
includes: presidential directives regarding bioterrorism,68 presidential 
counterintelligence directives,69 presidential directives regarding homeland 
security,70 intelligence law presidential directives,71 rules of engagement for 
military force and delegated subordinate military orders issued by the 
president,72 Memoranda of Notification (MONs) for the use of covert action,73 
and presidential national security directives.74  Finally, the axis of key Supreme 
Court decisions addressing national security includes the following essential 
corpus: the twenty-first century decision in Boumediene v. Bush,75 the 
twentieth century decisions in Navy v. Eagan,76 Dames & Moore v. Regan,77 
United States v. Snepp,78 United States v. Nixon,79 Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer,80 Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship 
Corp.,81 United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp.,82 The Paquette 
Habana,83 and the nineteenth century decisions in Totten v. United States84 and 
The Prize Cases.85 
Second, there exists the energy aesthetic of American law: “law is cast in 
the image of energy.  Conflicting forces of principle, policy, values, and 
politics collide and combine in sundry ways.”86  Here, “[p]recedents expand or 
contract in accordance with the push and pull of policy and principle.  Legal 
 
 66. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 67. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.) (declared partially unconstitutional). 
 68. JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR PERILOUS 
TIMES 285–86 (2007). 
 69. Id. at 147. 
 70. Id. at 250. 
 71. Id. at 127, 129–30, 134–35. 
 72. Id. at 225–30. 
 73. Id. at 153. 
 74. BAKER, supra note 68, at 105–10. 
 75. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 76. Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988). 
 77. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 78. Sneep v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
 79. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
 80. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 81. Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948). 
 82. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
 83. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
 84. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875). 
 85. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1862). 
 86. Schlag, supra note 51, at 1051. 
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rules, principles, policies, and values have magnitudes that must be quantified, 
measured and compared.  Movement and flux are the orders of the day.”87 
Modern American national security law is characterized by constantly 
shifting forces of policy, values, and principles that coalesce and recombine in 
many ways.  Among these energy aesthetics are legal and policy dynamics of 
four key forces involving “immediate and potentially catastrophic threats”88 to 
the United States: (1) “the threat of terrorist attack using a weapon of mass 
destruction (WMD)”;89 (2) national over-reaction by “measures that degrade 
the quality of our democracy”;90 (3) the pressure to make convenient 
compromises that “fail to fully protect against a WMD attack or to preserve 
those values that underpin both our security and our liberty” because “we may 
not agree as a society on the nature of the [security] threat and therefore the 
nature of the response”;91 and (4) assorted resource, organizational, political, 
and strategic costs “because we are distracted or divided, or . . . exhausted 
from guarding against the threat of the next terrorist attack on the American 
homeland or coping with foreign wars” to degrade our ability to address the 
century’s other certain threats such as “nuclear proliferation, instability in the 
Middle East, pandemic disease, environmental degradation, and energy and 
economic rivalry.”92 
Third, there is a perspectivist aesthetic of American law whereby: 
The identities of law and laws mutate in relation to point of view.  As the 
frame, context, perspective, or position of the actor or observer shifts, both fact 
and law come to have different identities.  Accordingly, the social or political 
identity of the legal actor or observer becomes the crucial situs of law and legal 
inquiry.93 
 
 87. Id. at 1051–52. 
 88. BAKER, supra note 68, at 1. 
 89. Id.  A WMD might entail any one or combination of the following: “a chemical, 
biological, radiological, or nuclear device.”  Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id.  In the evolving world of existential terrorist threats, the United States must also 
contemplate low-technology attacks like the mass gunmen attacks on civilians in Mumbai India 
during November 2008, and the murderous rampage by gun at Fort Hood, Texas in November 
2009.  See Gunman Kills 12, Wounds 31 at Fort Hood, MSNBC.COM (Nov. 5, 2009), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33678801/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/gunman-kills-wounds-
fort-hood/.  And, of course, there was the Christmas 2009 “underwear bomber” plot.  See Tim 
Starks, Making Them Talk, CQ WEEKLY, Jan. 11, 2010, at 102–08 (discussing Christmas 
bombing plot of December 2009 in the wider context of American national security).  Most 
recently, the failed “Times Square Terror” car bomb attack by a U.S. citizen is of concern.  See 
Yochi Dreazen & Evan Perez, Suspect Cites Radical Imam’s Writings, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2010, 
at A6. 
 92. BAKER, supra note 68, at 1. 
 93. Schlag, supra note 51, at 1052 (emphasis added). 
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Twenty-first century American national security law is subject to a 
multitude of different—and frequently conflicting—points of view.  By way of 
some limited illustrations, public international lawyers and United Nations 
devotees see the need for the primacy of the United Nations Charter, the 
Security Council, collective security, and norms of treaty and customary 
international law;94 members of the United States Congress tend to look at the 
federal legislature as the national fiduciary in matters of war and peace, with 
the president as a mere executive branch official (who happens to live in a 
fancy mansion and have access to a big jet and a powerful helicopter) whose 
national security responsibilities are authorized and controlled by Congress;95 
and American military soldiers, sailors, marines, and air force members are 
fixated on the constitutional chain of command (from the President, as 
Commander-in-Chief at the top, down to the Secretary of Defense, the relevant 
Combatant Commander to the hierarchical functional commanders of the 
ground element and support element of United States forces).96  The president 
has his or her own unique and lonely perspective of American national security 
law—from the presidential oath of office and other constitutional powers in 
Article II97 to the formal and informal processes of the National Security 
Council (NSC);98 from the input of executive department secretaries of State, 
Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and 
the president’s military advisers on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Situation 
Room staff99 and close White House advisers like the Vice President100 and the 
Chief of Staff. 
Finally, the dissociative aesthetic is disorienting and confusing when: 
[I]dentities collapse into each other.  Nothing is what it is, but is always 
something else.  Any attempt to refer to X is frustrated, as even the most 
minimal inquiry reveals that X is an unstable glomming-on of many other 
 
 94. See generally BAKER, supra note 68, at 192–225 (discussing international law treaties 
and principles involving resort to force, and methods and means of warfare). 
 95. See generally id. at 176–92 (discussing constitutional powers of Congress over war and 
national security, history of presidential use of force with and without congressional 
authorization, and the enactment of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 requiring presidents to 
consult, report and resolve military engagements according to congressional guidelines). 
 96. See generally id. at 225–39 (discussing the American constitutional military chain of 
command, the nine unified combatant commands and an appraisal of the military chain of 
command structure). 
 97. See generally Blomquist, Presiprudence, supra note 41, at 441–82 (explanation of 
relevance is encouraged). 
 98. See generally BAKER, supra note 68, at 105–19 (discussing the formal framework of the 
NSC, the National Security Council staff, and informal and ad hoc NSC processes). 
 99. See generally id. at 127, 142, 225–30 (discussing various executive departments’ inputs 
to the president on national security issues). 
 100. See generally id. at 119–21 (discussing the various roles played by recent vice-presidents 
in advising presidents on national security issues). 
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things that cannot be subsumed or stabilized within any one thing.  The crucial 
contributions of the prior aesthetics—the grid (and its fixed identities), energy 
(and its quantifiable magnitudes), and perspective[ist] (and its identifiable 
relations)—have all collapsed.  No determinable identities, relations, or 
perspectives survive.101 
In the realm of American national security law, the Supreme Court’s 
fractured opinions in Boumediene v. Bush102 (reflecting the collapse of 
coherent legal discourse) are Exhibit A for the dissociative aesthetic.  The 
holding of the Court was simple: foreign detainees at the Guantanamo Bay 
Naval Base in Cuba “have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus,” and 
this privilege cannot be withdrawn “except in conformance with the 
Suspension Clause.”103  Concluding that the procedures provided in the 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA)104 were not “an adequate and effective 
substitute for habeas corpus,”105 the majority held that the jurisdiction-
eliminating subsection of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA)106 
unconstitutionally suspended the ancient writ.107 
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy engaged in extensive historical analysis in 
an attempt to shed light on the original understanding of the English writ of 
habeas corpus at the time the U.S. Constitution went into effect in the late 
eighteenth century.  While Kennedy cited old, pre-1789 English cases for the 
unobjectionable purpose of construing the Founders’ intent in crafting the 
Suspension Clause,108 he also cited post-1789 English cases that were of 
questionable relevance in the Court’s original understanding exercise.109  With 
the exception of a mild and oblique rebuke by Justice Scalia,110 none of the 
nine Justices saw the Court’s opinion as controversial, no doubt because the 
English case citations were not being cited as foreign precedent, but rather to 
uncover the historic evolution of habeas corpus during English history so that 
the meaning of habeas corpus in the collective minds of the American 
Founders might be discerned.111  But in several other respects, the Justices in 
their respective majority opinion, concurring opinions, and dissenting opinions 
 
 101. Schlag, supra note 51, at 1052. 
 102. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 103. Id. at 732. 
 104. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, tit. 10, 119 Stat. 2680 (codified in 
part at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note (2006) (Detainee Policies)). 
 105. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732, 733. 
 106. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006). 
 107. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732, 733. 
 108. See, e.g., id. at 746. 
 109. See, e.g., id. at 753–54. 
 110. Id. at 827 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion’s analysis of British 
caselaw). 
 111. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
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seemed to be talking past one another.  A few examples will suffice to show 
the disassociation among the Justices.  One aspect of collapse—or legal 
meltdown—is Justice Souter’s assertions, in his concurring opinion, that the 
“Court’s exercise of responsibility to preserve habeas corpus [involves] 
something much more significant . . . than pulling and hauling between the 
judicial and political branches”112 and that “today’s decision is no judicial 
victory, but an act of perseverance in trying to make habeas review, and the 
obligation of the courts to provide it, mean something of value both to 
prisoners and to the Nation.”113 
A second example of the play of the dissociative aesthetic in Boumediene 
is Chief Justice Roberts’ broadside attack on the majority opinion with 
scorching comments like: “[t]he Court rejects [‘the most generous set of 
procedural protections ever afforded aliens detained by this country as enemy 
combatants’] . . . out of hand, without bothering to say what due process rights 
detainee possess, without explaining how the statute fails to vindicate those 
rights, and before a single petitioner has even attempted to avail himself of the 
law’s operation”;114 the Court’s decision [is] “an awkward business”;115 “[t]he 
majority’s overreaching . . . is egregious”;116 and “[i]f the Court can design a 
better system for communicating to detainees the substance of . . . classified 
information relevant to their cases, without fatally compromising national 
security interests and sources, the majority should come forward with it,” but 
“[i]nstead, the majority fobs that vexing question off on district courts to 
answer down the road.”117 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Boumediene provides a third 
instantiation of disassociation on the Supreme Court over national security 
law.118  Scalia’s dissent, indeed, strongly epitomizes what Professor Schlag has 
described as “the sensation” of the dissociative aesthetic in American law “of 
conceptual quicksand, of distinctions that dissipate—a kind of virtual 
jurisprudential reality in which identities morph into each other” when 
compared to the Boumediene majority.119 
Consider the following Scalian romp through what must feel like the 
conceptual quicksand of the majority’s opinion: (1) “The writ of habeas corpus 
does not, and never has, run in favor of aliens abroad; the Suspension Clause 
thus has no application, and the Court’s intervention in this military matter is 
 
 112. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 800 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.  The Chief Justice was joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito. 
 115. Id. at 808. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 825–84 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia was joined by the 
Chief Justice and by Justices Thomas and Alito. 
 119. Schlag, supra note 51, at 1097 (emphasis added). 
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entirely ultra vires”;120 (2) “America is at war with radical Islamists,” and they 
have “threatened further attacks against our homeland; one need only walk 
about buttressed and barricaded Washington, or board a plane anywhere in the 
country, to know that the threat is a serious one”;121 (3) “[t]he game of bait-
and-switch that today’s opinion plays upon the Nation’s Commander in Chief 
will make the war harder on us” and “[i]t will almost certainly cause more 
Americans to be killed”;122 (4) it is “incredibl[y] difficult[ ] [to] assess[ ] who 
is and who is not an enemy combatant in a foreign theater of operations where 
the environment does not lend itself to rigorous evidence collection,” but 
“[a]stoundingly, the Court today raises the bar, requiring military officials to 
appear before civilian courts and defend their decisions under procedural and 
evidentiary rules that go beyond what Congress has specified”;123 (5) “What 
competence does the Court have to second-guess the judgment of Congress 
and the President . . . ?  None whatsoever.  But the Court blunders in 
nonetheless,” and “[h]enceforth, as today’s opinion makes unnervingly clear, 
how to handle enemy prisoners in this war will ultimately lie with the branch 
that knows the least about the national security concerns that the subject 
entails,”;124 (6) “[t]he fundamental separation-of-powers principles that the 
Constitution embodies are to be derived not from some judicially imagined 
matrix, but from the sum total of the individual separation-of-powers 
provisions that the Constitution sets forth”;125 (7) “Manipulation of the 
territorial reach of the writ [of habeas corpus] by the judiciary poses just as 
much a threat to the proper separation of powers as manipulation by the 
Executive,” and “manipulation is afoot here”;126 and (8) the summary of his 
dissent at the culmination of his opinion: 
  Today the Court warps our Constitution in a way that goes beyond the 
narrow issue of the reach of the Suspension Clause, invoking judicially brain-
stormed separation-of-powers principles to establish a manipulable 
“functional” test for extraterritorial reach of habeas corpus . . . .  It blatantly 
misdescribes important precedents, most conspicuously Justice Jackson’s 
opinion for the Court in Johnson v. Eisentrager.  It breaks a chain of precedent 
as old as the common law that prohibits judicial inquiry into detentions of 
aliens abroad absent statutory authorization.  And, most tragically, it sets up 
our military commanders the impossible task of proving to a civilian court, 
under whatever standards this Court devises in the future, that evidence 
supports the confinement of each and every enemy prisoner. 
 
 120. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 827 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 829. 
 124. Id. at 831. 
 125. Id. at 832 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 126. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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  The Nation will live to regret what the Court has done today.  I dissent.127 
2. Five Types of National Security Legal Arguments 
The four aesthetics of national security law that I have discussed—the grid 
aesthetic, the energy aesthetic, the perspectivist aesthetic, and the dissociative 
aesthetic—relate to, and interact in interesting ways with, what Professor 
Wilson Huhn calls The Five Types of Legal Arguments.128 
According to Huhn: “Legal arguments may be based upon text, intent, 
precedent, tradition, or policy analysis.”129  In overarching terms, he explains 
that “[t]he five types of legal arguments represent different conceptions of 
what law is.”130  Thus: 
Law may be considered to be a legal text itself.  It may be regarded as what the 
text meant to the people who enacted it into law.  Law may be conceived as the 
holdings or opinions of courts setting forth what law is.  It may be thought of 
as the traditional ways in which members of the community have conducted 
themselves.  Finally, law may be understood as the expression of the 
underlying values and interests that the law is meant to serve.  The five types 
of legal argument arise from these different sources of law.131 
Professor Huhn provides more specificity to the five types of legal 
argument in ways that can be helpful in unpacking the theoretical normative 
form and function of American national security law.  First, as he points out, 
“[t]he primary source of law in our [American] society is legal text.”132 
Legal text includes the Constitution of the United States and the state 
constitutions, federal and state statutes, municipal ordinances, administrative 
regulations, and any other public writings that have the force of law.  The term 
“legal text” also includes privately written documents such as contracts, wills, 
deeds, checks, and promissory notes.  Although these private documents are 
 
 127. Id. at 849.  The disassociative aesthetic also exists when “global legalists,” in Eric 
Posner’s words, speak past the realities of self-interested nation-states in matters of war and 
peace.  See ERIC POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 36–37 (2009) (the U.N. charter is 
viewed by global legalists as encompassing jus cogens norms that “supersede all other 
international law, and that states may not opt out of or change these norms” but “[t]he problem 
with this view is that states, including leading states,” and others violate these norms on occasion, 
such as the “military intervention in Kosovo by NATO forces in 1999” that “violated the U.N. 
charter and was clearly illegal,” leading many international lawyers to engage in the doublespeak 
that the war was “illegal but legitimate”). 
 128. WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 13 (2d ed. 2008). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. (emphasis added). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 17 (emphasis added). 
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not law in and of themselves, they are legal texts because they create or alter 
legal rights.133 
Second, another type of legal argument and “source of law is the intent of 
the people who wrote the text.  This principle is applicable to every area of the 
law, but it is called by different names in each area.”134  Thus, there is an intent 
behind constitutional provisions, statutes, regulations, and wills of testators.135  
“Evidence of intent may be drawn from the text of the law itself, from previous 
versions of the text, from its drafting history, from official comments, or from 
contemporary commentary.”136 
A third type of legal argument and source of law is precedent of judicial 
“decisions of higher courts within the same jurisdiction and appl[ication] [of] 
the doctrine of stare decisis to previous decisions of the same [authoritative] 
court.”137  Moreover, the aforementioned controlling, or binding, precedent is 
to be distinguished from merely persuasive authority that typically is a function 
of “the location, level, and reputation of the court issuing the [non-binding] 
decision.”138 
A fourth type of legal argument and source of law is tradition.  As 
Professor Huhn opines, “[t]radition often exerts a silent influence on legal 
reasoning.  Our traditions establish ‘baselines,’ which are background 
assumptions that favor the status quo and place the burden of proof on any 
person who seeks to change the existing order.”139  And, “[s]imilar to baselines 
are ‘cognitive schemas,’ which are unexamined and often unspoken 
assumptions about human potential that purport to explain existing social 
relationships.”140 
Fifth, a final type of legal argument and source of law is policy.  As 
explained by Huhn, legal arguments based on policy analysis are different in 
fundamental ways from arguments based on text, intent, precedent, and 
tradition.141 
The distinctive feature of policy arguments is that they are consquentialist in 
nature.  The other four types of arguments are appeals to authority, but the core 
of a policy argument is that a certain interpretation of the law will bring about 
a certain state of affairs, and this state of affairs is either acceptable or 
unacceptable, in the eyes of the law.  Deriving rules of law from text, intent, 
precedent and tradition is inherently conventional; such rules represent specific 
 
 133. Id. at 17. 
 134. HUHN, supra note 128, at 31 (emphasis added). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 34. 
 137. Id. at 115. 
 138. Id. at 119. 
 139. Id. at 49 (footnote omitted). 
 140. HUHN, supra note 128, at 49−50 (footnote omitted). 
 141. Id. at 51. 
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choices that our lawgivers have already made.  Deriving rules from policy 
arguments, on the other hand, is inherently open-ended; the specific choice has 
not yet been made.  Text, intent, precedent and tradition look principally to the 
past for guidance; policy arguments look to the future for confirmation.142 
In the realm of American national security law, Professor Huhn’s five 
essential legal arguments—of text, intent, precedent, tradition, and policy—
involve interesting permutations.  Textual language of the U.S. Constitution 
focuses national security powers on the president through a number of 
expansive, but ambiguous, provisions.  Congress, too, is given textual 
constitutional powers that can—if the powers are actually exercised—check a 
president’s national security actions.  Occasionally Congress finds it politically 
expedient to pass statutory restrictions on presidential national security 
discretion.  Presidents tend to rhetorically resist these statutory textual limits, 
on one level, but try to placate Congress as much as possible, on other levels.  
In the realm of American national security law and policy, the key legal 
arguments involve a constitutionally sanctioned “invitation to struggle [over 
the text of the Constitution] for the privilege of directing American foreign 
policy,”143 to protect the nation from hostile existential threats, and to preserve 
the homeland against catastrophic attack. 
The intent of the Founders strongly suggests that when they invented the 
unique institution of the American Presidency, they fully expected the 
president to be the national security sentinel who would be counted on to take 
the lead in planning for and implementing the armed defense of the nation.  
First, “the intellectual roots of the American presidency—those antecedents in 
legal history and political philosophy, the lessons of history, and the lessons of 
Colonial and Revolutionary experience— . . . indicate, that, the Founders 
fashioned the institution with the contextual expectation and goal for 
Presidents to have expansive powers to pursue American national security.”144  
Second, the predominant number and gravitas of Founders favored a strong 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. CORWIN, supra note 1, at 171. 
 144. Blomquist, Presiprudence, supra note 41, at 441–42.  This contextual intent of the 
Founders consists of their familiarity and support for the great commentators of English law and 
English constitutional custom of extensive “kingly command” to conduct foreign relations, make 
war or peace and to suppress insurrections; the Founders’ support for political theory of a strong 
executive to sometimes push the limits of the law in order to preserve the nation; historical 
lessons regarding the importance of robust executive powers, flexibly administered, to preserve 
public order and public liberty; and the Colonial and Revolutionary experience of frustration with 
a multiplicity of executives in the Continental Congress and state governments trying—often at 
cross-purposes—to win the war against Great Britain and, subsequently, to govern after 
independence had been achieved.  Id. at 442–48. 
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executive to respond to and deal with unknown national exigencies and 
emergencies.145 
Tradition is the customary exercise of “unspecified but real powers,” 
exercised by American presidents from George Washington onward, pursuant 
to the “positive grant” of the vesting of all executive power in the 
president146—to “preserve, protect and defend,” according to the Presidential 
Oath Clause,147 the constitutional sovereignty of the United States.  It is a 
powerful national security law argument for expansive presidential power, 
subject to limited checking by Congress through clear statutory restrictions.148  
Justice Felix Frankfurter identified the importance of tradition in gauging the 
scope of presidential national security powers.  In Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, he stated: 
Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot supplant 
the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text or 
supply them.  It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American 
constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to 
disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.149 
Precedents for interpreting American national security policy are derived 
from three principal bodies of law: the handful of key U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions on the constitutional nature of executive and congressional powers to 
protect the nation;150 the corpus of presidential security directives, memoranda 
and rules of engagement;151 and the compilation of congressional enactments 
on national security affairs in the United States Code.152  While judicial 
precedents are well known and recognized, it is important to recognize and 
understand the importance of what Professor Michael J. Gerhardt calls 
“nonjudicial precedent,”153 exemplified by congressional and presidential 
actions and non-actions in the face of national security crises. 
Finally, policy arguments about the potential consequences of institutional 
competence and authority, effective deterrence and interdiction of enemies 
foreign and domestic, as well as national safety and well-being are critical in 
the realm of national security legal interpretation.  Indeed, the new geopolitical 
 
 145. Id. at 448–51. 
 146. FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 220 
(1994); see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 147. Blomquist, Presidential Oath, supra note 43, at 52; see supra notes 43–44 and 
accompanying text. 
 148. See Blomquist, Presiprudence, supra note 41, at 451–57. 
 149. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
 150. See supra notes 68–74 and accompanying text. 
 151. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text. 
 153. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 111 (2008). 
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realities facing the United States in the aftermath of September 11th and the 
global jihad instigated and organized by al Qaeda and other terrorist groups 
and affiliated rogue nation states illustrate the importance of fortifying and 
enhancing the American national security legal system to better anticipate and 
manage these threats in the future.154 
III.  THE PROBLEM WITH AMERICAN JUDICIAL RELIANCE ON FOREIGN JUDICIAL 
PRECEDENT IN NATIONAL SECURITY ADJUDICATION 
It is unwise for United States Supreme Court Justices to cite transnational 
judicial precedent—opinions in cases decided by national or sub-national 
courts other than the United States, international tribunals like the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), or the European Court of Human Rights—in any matter 
before the Supreme Court involving American national security.  National 
Security law cases that come to the Supreme Court will deal expressly, or by 
implication, with a matrix of decisions by the presidents of the United States.  
These presidential decisions will involve core Article II presiprudential 
national security determinations155 that may be augmented or limited by core 
Article I congressional powers over war, military provision, and regulation of 
foreign affairs.156  Supreme Court Justices can resolve national security 
problems of knowledge157 by reading background books, articles, and 
government documents.158  Judicial resolution of the separate national security 
problems of conduct159 and problems of governance160 should be prudentially 
limited to American sources of law—the U.S. Constitution, federal statutory 
law, presidential decision orders, and past U.S. Supreme Court precedent.161  
Our Justices should seek, as much as practicable, to make judicial rulings and 
supporting judicial opinions by privileging the president’s perspective on 
national security needs carefully balanced by Congress’ perspective162 as 
revealed by clearly-stated, specific textual statutory enactments.163  In difficult 
cases of apparent national security conflict between the President and 
Congress, the Court should rely on past Supreme Court cases164 that interpret 
the grid aesthetic165 with the energy aesthetic.166  The most relevant Supreme 
 
 154. See Blomquist, Presiprudence, supra note 41, at 467–75. 
 155. See supra notes 41–49, 58 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 157. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 158. See Blomquist, Jurisprudence, supra note 13. 
 159. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See supra notes 55–85 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra notes 68–74 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
 164. See supra notes 75–85 and accompanying text. 
 165. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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Court precedent in this regard is and will remain the various opinions in the 
Youngstown case.167 
Four specific functional reasons168 militate in favor of Supreme Court 
reliance on exclusively American law and precedent in national security 
disputes and against citation of foreign judicial precedent as persuasive 
authority in cases and controversies dealing with American national security: 
(a) ethos and American identity, (b) effective dispute resolution, (c) 
meaningful agenda-setting and constitutional dialogue, and (d) judicial 
political legitimacy. 
A. Ethos and American Identity 
The ethos of American national security law is predicated on the unique, 
vast, and disproportionate financial and human burden endured by the 
American people over the last century in responding to aggressive wars by 
other nations and terrorist acts by non-state and state actors.169  Moreover, 
American constitutional systemic form and function establishes the President 
of the United States as the national security sentinel with great discretion in 
deciding how to preserve, protect, and defend the American nation.170  Also, 
our Supreme Court Justices cannot forget that, unlike other national 
constitutions (e.g. Germany and South Africa) that expressly invite the 
reception of international and comparative law in domestic courts, the 
American constitutional tradition is much more conservative in allowing the 
use of foreign law.171  Thus, the national security policy established by the 
President and Congress on behalf of the American people is distinctive and 
arguably sui generis in the world given the context of great burdens carried by 
the United States in the name of global security over the last century. 
The “whole American fabric,” identified by Chief Justice John Marshall in 
support of the Court’s decision in Marbury v. Madison172 and the related 
 
 166. See Schlag, supra note 51, at 1051.1051−52. 
 167. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 168. My analysis at this juncture relies upon GERHARDT, supra note 153, at 147–76 (chapter 
5, entitled, The Multiple Functions of Precedent). 
 169. See, e.g., SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 
848–87, 987–1045, 1065–73 (1965) (American role in World War I, World War II, and Korean 
war); JAMES T. PATTERSON, GREAT EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945–1974, at 510–
13, 593–636 (1996) (Vietnam War); JAMES T. PATTERSON, RESTLESS GIANT: THE UNITED 
STATES, FROM WATERGATE TO BUSH V. GORE 230–38 (2005) (Gulf War I). 
 170. See supra notes 33–49 and accompanying text. 
 171. See Jan M. Smits, Comparative Law and Its Influence on National Legal Systems, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 514–30 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard 
Zimmermann eds., 2006). 
 172. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
468 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXX:439 
national ethos argument by Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland,173 invoking 
the American “Constitution intended to endure for ages to come,”174 parallel 
the nationally distinctive constitutional imperative to acknowledge the 
distinctive national security authority of the President, as balanced by 
Congress, in making and applying national security law.  Such a unique 
American national security apparatus is part of our nation’s collective identity 
and must, in the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “be considered 
in light of our whole experience . . . “175 as a nation for over two centuries in 
enduring various wars, emergencies, and threats. 
It is a red herring argument for proponents of judicial cosmopolitanism to 
contend that citations of foreign judicial decisions are not in the nature of 
binding precedent but, merely, persuasive precedent.176  Indeed, persuasive 
precedent—especially when cited and blessed by United States Supreme Court 
judicial opinions—can take on the functional gravitas of binding precedent.  
By way of a useful analogy, Michael Dorf explained the “functional notion of 
precedent” in the context of disputing the formalist doctrine that civil law 
jurisdictions—in Europe and elsewhere—do not recognize precedent.  
According to Professor Dorf, other scholars have joined his view that the “civil 
law jurisdictions do have a doctrine of precedent.”177  Moreover: 
The proliferation in recent years of trans-European and other international 
courts that publish their judgments accompanied by lengthy opinions in the 
“American” style—and that adjudicate cases for both common law and civil 
law countries—only further erodes the notion that high-profile adjudication 
can proceed without a functional notion of precedent.178 
 
 173. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 174. Id. at 415. 
 175. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (involving the Court’s interpretation of 
the federal government’s treaty-making power versus state power regarding the international 
issue of migratory bird conservation). 
 176. See, e.g., Justice Kennedy’s conclusion in Roper v. Simmons “that foreign experience 
merely confirmed the conclusions he and his colleagues would have otherwise reached 
independently . . . .”  Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 103, 169 n.188 (2008).  In Justice Kennedy’s own words: “The opinion of the world 
community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant 
confirmation of our own conclusions.”  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
 177. Dorf, supra note 176, at 159, 159 n.162 (citing MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF 
JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 36–38 (1986) (“While formally free to disregard legal opinions 
of their superiors, [civil law] judges continued to look to high courts for guidance.”); PETER 
GOODRICH, READING THE LAW: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL METHOD & TECHNIQUES 
39 (1986) (“The status of jurisprudence as law is informally recognized in that reference to 
previous decisions containing interpretations of the law is made during the course of legal 
argument [in civil law courts], and may be found in notes and commentaries made about the 
code.”)). 
 178. Dorf, supra note 176, at 159. 
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Thus, applying Dorf’s pragmatic insight to the potential citation of foreign 
judicial decisions by U.S. Supreme Court Justices as persuasive precedent in 
American national security cases, these so-called non-binding precedents have 
the significant potential of morphing into functionally binding American 
precedents notwithstanding the different ethos of foreign national security 
precedent.  This development would be profoundly unwise given that 
“[p]recedents are integral to the nation’s understanding of itself and how the 
[American] public and public authorities conceive the nation,”179 and 
American national security Supreme Court precedents are, like other core 
American precedents in areas such as civil rights and equal protection, 
“essential elements of our distinctive national identity.”180  In a related way, 
Supreme Court national security precedents are important symbols181 of the 
American constitutional ethos of “a common defense.”182 
B. Effective Dispute Resolution 
To resolve disputes that come before the Supreme Court, it is advisable for 
the Justices “to proceed, as Chief Justice Roberts suggested . . . from the 
‘bottom up’ by which he means incrementally, one case at a time, and on the 
narrowest grounds possible.”183  According to Michael J. Gerhardt’s 
penetrating analysis of “bottom up” judging in The Power of Precedent, this 
approach to dispute resolution “means that the Court ought to decide particular 
cases based on what it can learn from other actors and experience,” so that 
“[b]y deciding cases from the bottom up, the Court leaves more room for the 
other branches [the Executive and the Congress] to operate and positions itself 
to learn from its and other constitutional actors’ experiences.”184 
Citation of transnational judicial precedent in national security cases by 
Supreme Court Justices would constitute a troublesome variation of top-down 
judging.  In the process of such citation, Supreme Court Justices would be 
“impos[ing] on lower courts or other authorities principles directly inferred 
from the Constitution,”185 utilizing foreign judicial precedent as a 
“reassurance” that the Supreme Court was in the mainstream of other 
prestigious foreign courts in discerning normative principles of national 
security governance that regulate how far the executive can go in protecting 
the nation and how much oversight and checking authority the national 
legislature should enjoy over national security affairs.  But top-down judging 
 
 179. GERHARDT, supra note 153, at 171. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See id. at 169–70 (discussing the symbolism functional purpose of precedent). 
 182. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 183. GERHARDT, supra note 153, at 151. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
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in this fashion allows the Supreme Court “no margin of error” since “the Court 
has to get it right from the start or risk having its error perpetuated and spread 
through the enforcement of its decisions.”186  Moreover, the risk of error is 
exacerbated by a misguided citation of foreign judicial precedent that may 
have been taken out of the context of the foreign legal system where the 
precedent originated. 
By withholding citation to foreign judicial precedent in American national 
security disputes as well as restraining itself from directly inferring broad 
principles from the Constitution, “the Court minimizes the risks of error, so it 
can avoid overreaching its competence, not unduly interfere with other 
branches’ constitutional decision-making [over national security issues], and 
learn from its own mistakes and the mistakes of other institutions.”187  Indeed, 
“[a]mong the things [the Court] will learn over time,” by engaging in bottom-
up judging in national security cases, “is how much, or little, it should explain 
the reasons for its decisions.”188  One suspects that the political costs of citing 
foreign judicial precedent in American national security disputes—and over 
theorizing transnational norms of executive and legislative power discretion—
would always outweigh whatever minor benefits exist in advancing the cause 
of judicial cosmopolitanism. 
C. Meaningful Agenda-Setting and Constitutional Dialogue 
Since 2004, the Supreme Court has sent “important signals to litigants, 
lower courts, and other public authorities”189 that have invited litigation against 
presidential and congressional legal arrangements to address the “war on 
terror,” otherwise known as radical Islamic insurgencies against the United 
States in Iraq and Afghanistan.  By accepting certiorari petitions and ruling 
against the President and Congress in a line of decisions—including Rasul v. 
Bush,190 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,191 and Boumediene v. Bush192—the Court has 
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 190. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (holding that the federal habeas statute extends 
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 192. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 791 (2008) (holding that foreign detainees at the 
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that such a privilege cannot be withdrawn “except in conformance with the Suspension Clause” 
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note 104, were not an adequate substitute for habeas corpus and that the jurisdiction-stripping 
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established precedent that will invite further litigation that seeks to challenge 
American national security presiprudence.  Moreover, the line of cases that 
commenced in 2004 has been vague and vigorously contested, resulting in 
splintered Court opinions.  Indeed, Boumediene “adopted an uncertain and 
malleable test” and “the Court’s holding leave many questions unanswered and 
could allow an administration that is determined to keep detainees beyond the 
jurisdiction of U.S. courts to use other avenues of accomplishing its ultimate 
goal.”193 
In light of the wrenching changes in American national security that have 
transpired since September 11th, it is salutary that the Court has used a line of 
precedent to set a judicial agenda for constitutionally scrutinizing novel 
national security legislation and presidential policy making.  Thus far, the 
Court’s agenda-setting on habeas corpus and national security has led to and 
facilitated a constitutional dialogue about the meaning of prior U.S. Supreme 
Court holdings that have interpreted constitutional text.194  The Rasul-
Hamdan-Boumediene line of precedent has framed, informed, and guided a 
constitutional dialogue among American judges, lawyers, presidents, members 
of Congress, academics, military officers, and the public at large.  This 
dialogue has pragmatically focused on American sources of law.  As Robert 
Post has argued, “constitutional law and culture are locked in a dialectical 
relationship, so that constitutional law both arises from and in turn regulates 
[American] culture.”195  It would be antithetical to the ongoing national 
conversation about American national security presiprudence in the post 
September 11th era, in general, and counterproductive to the national 
conversation on habeas corpus and national security, in particular, to have 
Justices cite foreign judicial precedents.  The American national security 
constitutional culture is wrapped up in and defined by the American 
experience, American values, and American interests.  It would be incendiary 
for a U.S. Supreme Court Justice to cite a foreign judicial precedent in the 
 
provision of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006), 
unconstitutionally suspended the writ). 
 193. The Supreme Court-Leading Cases: Extraterritorial Reach of Writ of Habeas Corpus, 
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 195. Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and 
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ongoing post-September 11th national debate on national security and the 
Constitution. 
D. Judicial Political Legitimacy 
A final functional reason for urging Supreme Court Justices to avoid 
citation of foreign judicial precedents in reviewing American national security 
presiprudence is for the Court to maintain its political legitimacy.  Indeed, 
political legitimacy for the Court is very fragile and vulnerable in the realm of 
constitutional review of national security policy.  First, Supreme Court 
decisions depend on the “social acquiescence” of the American people and 
particular elites within American society.196  The Court has suffered a strong 
backlash from its Boumediene v. Bush decision from an editorial in a national 
newspaper197 to the reaction of a presidential candidate.198  How much stronger 
would the backlash have been if the Boumediene Court had cited a foreign 
judicial precedent in support of its holding? 
Second, “a precedent,” in order to achieve and maintain political 
legitimacy, “has to receive the genuine, enduring commitment of political 
institutions” to the principles articulated in the Supreme Court opinion.199  
Foreign judicial precedents that are incorporated by reference in Supreme 
Court national security opinions risk alienating significant numbers of 
members of Congress, the President, and the American military. 
Third, the political legitimacy of a Supreme Court opinion also depends on 
sound persuasion.  The Supreme Court opinion needs “to be grounded in 
sufficiently persuasive reasoning, argumentation, rhetoric, or imagery as to 
cultivate, maintain, and win the longstanding support of at least the Court and 
the leadership of other [American] public institutions.”200  Citation of a foreign 
judicial precedent by a Supreme Court Justice in an American national security 
presiprudence case is likely to be a “shot from the hip” with little, if any, 
rhetorical salience to the meaning and protection of American national 
security. 
CONCLUSION 
The form and function of the American national security system posits an 
invitation to struggle between the President and Congress, with the Supreme 
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Court as constitutional arbiter.  The Supreme Court, in turn, faces problems of 
knowledge, conduct, and governance whenever the Court engages in judicial 
review of national security cases.  The aesthetics of American national security 
law, while reticulated by a grid of textual constitutional provisions, statutory 
enactments, presidential directives, and Court precedent, is predominantly 
shaped by the energy of the push and pull between (and often within) the three 
branches of the federal government and the differing perspectives of 
government officials within American government.  On occasion, when 
extraordinarily important national security issues call out for resolution, 
government officials dissociate from robust interchange and engagement with 
one another and end up talking past one another. 
American sources of law and policy are appropriate for conceptualizing 
and analyzing problems of American national security.  It would be unwise for 
our Supreme Court to cite foreign judicial precedent to resolve American 
national security problems for the fourfold reasons: (1) that ethos and 
American identity is implicated by American national security cases; (2) that 
effective national security dispute resolution should not utilize a top-down 
judicial resolution by the Court’s looking to foreign precedent to reassure itself 
that its inference of broad constitutional principles are correct; (3) that 
meaningful agenda-setting and constitutional dialogue concerning American 
national security law in the post-September 11th era is best achieved by 
prudent, respectful, and diligent exchange of American-derived legal 
arguments from the wide panoply of American national security texts, 
precedents, traditions, and policies; and (4) that the imperative of the Supreme 
Court to maintain political legitimacy is particularly important in the national 
security arena where the Constitution has assigned a predominant role to 
presidents to develop American national security presiprudence and to 
Congress to act as a junior partner in this existential enterprise. 
All of this is not to suggest that the Supreme Court should foreclose good, 
potential ideas from transnational experience and theory that address twenty-
first century national security problems.  But the Court should eschew citation 
of transnational precedent.  When considering the power and fit of 
transnational national security ideas, the Court should mention the books, 
articles, papers, statutes, case opinions, and the like as bearing on diverse 
policy perspectives, not persuasive precedent.201 
  
 
 201. Cf. VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 
(2010) (arguing for cautious engagement by the Supreme Court with transnational sources of law 
in interpreting the American Constitution). 
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